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Volume Dynamics and Multimarket Trading 
 
 
Abstract 
The trading of shares of the same firm in multiple markets has become common over the 
last thirty years, but there is little empirical evidence on the extent to which investors actively 
exploit multimarket environments. We introduce a volume-based measure of multimarket 
trading to address this question. Analyzing a large set of cross-listed firms, we find higher 
multimarket trading among markets with similar designs and strong enforcement of insider 
trading laws and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These findings are important for 
firms evaluating the benefits of cross-listing and for markets competing for order flow.  
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I. Introduction  
Whenever the stock of one firm is traded on multiple markets, as is the case for firms that list shares 
on both their domestic market and a cross-listing market, discretionary investors have a choice of where 
to trade.1 Theoretical models show that the optimal choices of discretionary investors (investors who can 
choose where to trade) may result in an equilibrium consisting of all trading concentrated in one market, 
most trading concentrated in one market, or substantial trading in both markets.2 Yet empirically we have 
little evidence of the extent to which discretionary investors actively trade in multiple markets and why. 
As more shares of the same firm are traded in multiple markets (an environment already established in the 
U.S. and well under way in Europe), it is increasingly important to traders, policymakers, market 
operators, and issuers whether multimarket trading creates a single integrated market or separate pockets 
of liquidity. Large traders are concerned about price impact minimization, while policymakers, market 
operators, and issuers are concerned with market efficiency and overall market quality.3 In this paper we 
examine the dynamics of trading volume in a multimarket setting to capture the degree to which traders 
actively exploit multimarket environments and treat competing markets as one market. We then identify 
both market- and firm- level factors that explain variation in multimarket trading across markets and over 
time.4  
If there are non-discretionary (captive) liquidity traders in both markets, discretionary liquidity 
traders and privately informed traders should split their trades across markets and concentrate their trades 
during overlapping trading hours for many reasons, including to minimize the price impact of their trades, 
to exploit their informational advantages, to strategically enhance their informational advantages, or to 
                                                     
1 For evidence that investors view domestic and cross-listed stocks of the same firm as close substitutes, see JPMorgan (2003) 
and Moulton and Wei (2009).  
2 See, for example, Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), and Menkveld (2008). 
3 Evidence of the beneficial role of an integrated multimarket trading environment in the U.S. can be found in O’Hara and Ye 
(2010), who argue that the documented improvement in market quality is due to the integration of trade across multiple trading 
platforms achieved through regulation (Reg NMS).   
4 Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) examine empirically the equilibrium distribution of trading 
across competing markets, a question which is related to but distinct from ours. 
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exploit delays in the market's reaction to related information. Thus a demand shock to trade by 
discretionary traders should lead to higher volume in both markets. Furthermore, a central tenet of 
financial economics is that arbitrage enforces the law of one price. When temporary mispricings arise 
between domestic and cross-listed shares, arbitrage activity should lead to a volume shock in both 
markets.5  
Motivated by these theories of multimarket trading, we investigate the correlation of trading volume 
shocks in domestic and cross-listed shares as a potential measure of multimarket trading. We further 
examine the relation of trading volume shock correlations to multimarket trading barriers and benefits. 
Explicit (such as little overlap in trading hours) or implicit (such as different market designs) barriers may 
discourage multimarket traders (trade-splitters and arbitrageurs) from trading in both markets, thereby 
reducing the correlation of trading volume shocks between markets. Greater potential benefits from 
multimarket trading should act as catalysts and lead to higher correlations.  
Of course, multimarket trading of discretionary traders is not the only possible explanation for such 
positive volume shock correlations; they could also arise from correlated trading needs of captive 
investors who respond to public firm-specific news or common economic shocks across markets. We do 
not expect a priori that the correlation in daily trading volume shocks is driven exclusively by correlated 
trading needs. Feng and Seasholes (2004) find little evidence of correlated trading needs at the daily level; 
correlated trading needs generally appear significant only at longer frequencies such as quarterly or 
monthly. Furthermore, in his study of British cross-listed stocks Menkveld (2008) finds evidence of 
multimarket trading even after controlling for the possibility of local traders in each market 
simultaneously receiving the same private signal and trading on it locally.  
Empirically, we expect that if correlated trading volume shocks were driven purely by correlated 
trading needs in the two markets, we should find no relation between the trading volume shock 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Sexton, Kling and Carman (1991), Campbell and Hamao (1992), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a). 
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correlations and multimarket trading barriers and benefits. Multimarket trading barriers and benefits often 
depend on characteristics of both the domestic and the foreign market (e.g., differences in market design). 
Captive investors, however, by definition can trade only in their domestic market and thus consider only 
the characteristics of their domestic market. Thus, if correlated trading by captive investors is driving the 
correlations, our empirical proxies for multimarket trading barriers and benefits should not explain the 
variation in volume shock correlations. In this case, we could not interpret the correlation of trading 
volume shocks as a signal of multimarket trading.  
We analyze trading in the stocks of 361 firms from 24 countries that are cross-listed in the United 
States between 1980 and 2001. We first estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model for each firm each 
year to estimate daily unexpected trading volume in the domestic and cross-listing markets. The model 
controls for possible order flow commonalities across markets and simultaneous trading by captive 
investors in both markets. The residuals from the VAR are our measures of daily trading volume shocks, 
and the correlation between the residuals from the domestic and cross-listing markets is our proposed 
measure of multimarket trading. The average correlation in our sample is 0.28, and 88 percent of the firm-
year correlations are different from zero at the five percent level of significance. The correlations rise 
substantially over our sample period, especially between emerging markets and the U.S. but also for many 
developed markets and the U.S.  
In a multivariate framework, we find that the degree to which trading volume shocks in domestic and 
cross-listed shares are correlated depends on market-level barriers and benefits to multimarket trading. 
The markets in our sample generally do not have explicit government or regulatory barriers to 
multimarket trading.6 The barriers and benefits we examine arise from market structure and the regulatory 
environment. For example, markets with more overlapping trading hours and no short-sale constraints 
                                                     
6 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002a,b) investigate changes in explicit barriers to multimarket trading by analyzing the 
impact of official capital market reforms on the level of integration of emerging markets. All markets that we investigate are open 
to foreign investments not only through the ADR market but also in their domestic markets. Our primary focus is the extent to 
which investors are able and willing to trade in both markets.  
- 4 - 
generally have higher correlations, consistent with our expectation that these features facilitate trade-
splitting and arbitrage across markets. Similarly, we find higher trading volume shock correlations when 
the domestic and cross-listing markets have similar market designs and stronger enforcement of insider 
trading laws.  
We also examine whether firm characteristics play an important role in multimarket trading.7 There 
is significant variation in the correlation of trading volume shocks across firms from the same country. At 
the firm level, correlations are higher for stocks that are actively traded in both markets, a situation likely 
to make both trade-splitting and arbitrage easier. Correlations are also higher for firms with more 
institutional investors (who are more likely than retail investors to engage in multimarket trading) and for 
firms that are technology-oriented, which tend to be more successful in creating an active market in their 
cross-listed shares (Halling et al. (2008)).  
An important question is how multimarket trading relates to price integration. The extant literature 
on price integration tests whether assets with similar risk exposure earn similar expected returns in 
different national markets.8 A key observation from our study is that multimarket trading captures an 
additional dimension of the broad concept of financial market integration, one that is not fully captured by 
the extent to which prices of identical assets are close (price integration).9 We provide empirical evidence 
that markets with high levels of multimarket trading, measured by trading volume shock correlations, 
consistently exhibit small price discrepancies, quantified by the Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a) price 
disparity measure. However, price integration may occur without actual multimarket trading if there is a 
credible threat of its occurrence should prices diverge. Our multimarket trading measure thus captures a 
                                                     
7 Gagnon and Karolyi (2009) find that firm-specific characteristics in addition to market characteristics explain the extent of price 
disparities for a sample of cross-listed stocks. In earlier studies, Jorion and Schwartz (1986) and Mittoo (1992) also consider 
firm-specific characteristics in the context of market integration. 
8 See, e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2008) and 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). 
9 Previous studies of cross-listings have shown that most domestic and cross-listing markets are highly integrated from a pricing 
perspective at both the daily and the intraday frequency (e.g., Werner and Kleidon (1996), Kim, Szakmary, and Mathur (2000), 
Hupperets and Menkveld (2002), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a)). 
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different dimension that complements the existing evidence on price integration. Compared to tests of 
price integration that rely on a specific asset pricing model and face a joint hypothesis problem, our 
multimarket trading measure is also a simple, intuitive, and model-free metric that requires only daily 
volume data to estimate.  
Our study has important implications for firms considering the value of cross-listing. In an 
application of our multimarket trading measure, we show that the degree of multimarket trading after a 
firm cross-lists is strongly related to the improvement in liquidity enjoyed by the firm after cross listing. 
If a firm’s goal in cross-listing is to create a global trading environment for its shares, it would do well to 
examine the trading barriers and benefits of potential cross-listing venues. Firms with a more integrated 
trading environment generally have more institutional investors. As Boehmer and Kelley (2009) show, 
higher institutional participation improves market quality and market efficiency. As a result prices are 
closer to fundamentals and exhibit lower idiosyncratic volatility. Such improvements in liquidity can 
lower a firm’s cost of capital. Furthermore, our results regarding market features that are instrumental in 
creating an integrated multimarket trading environment should be of interest to countries and exchanges 
seeking to attract more volume and increase their market share.  
Finally, by analyzing a large sample of firms over many years, we reveal a rich set of market- and 
firm-level determinants of multimarket trading. We explicitly evaluate the sources of variation in the level 
of multimarket trading across firms as well as across markets. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
address these issues. For example, Menkveld (2008) tests his theoretical model empirically using 25 
British and four Dutch stocks cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). While Menkveld 
(2008) proxies for the fraction of non-discretionary traders on the NYSE, his study design does not allow 
for a broader analysis of market-level or firm-level factors.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the theoretical literature on 
multimarket trading and develops the research hypotheses. Section III discusses the sample and data. 
Section IV analyzes trading volume shock correlations. Section V examines the relation between trading 
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volume shock correlations and multimarket trading barriers and benefits. Section VI compares trading 
volume shock correlations to other measures of integration at the market level. Section VII examines the 
relation between multimarket trading and liquidity for firms around their cross-listing dates. Section VIII 
concludes. The Appendix contains a detailed discussion of the rationale for and calculation of each proxy 
for multimarket trading barriers and benefits.  
II. Background and Hypothesis Development  
The mere cross-listing of stocks does not guarantee that multimarket trading will occur. For example, 
Pagano (1989) identifies a winner-takes-all equilibrium when there are no frictions protecting one market. 
His intuition is that positive trading externalities favor the concentration of trading in one market, because 
the presence of more traders provides better liquidity for any one order. In this case, we would see no 
correlation between trading volume shocks in the two markets, which functions as a natural null 
hypothesis for our study.  
Several models of the equilibrium distribution of trading volume across markets are based on the 
intuition that traders are motivated to split their trades across markets to enhance their welfare. In addition 
to his winner-takes-all equilibrium, Pagano (1989) identifies an equilibrium in which two markets can 
coexist when there are trading frictions. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) derive winner-takes-most equilibria 
when each market has a certain fraction of noise traders who must trade in their home market. Both of 
these models assume that trading hours for the two competing markets coincide perfectly. Menkveld 
(2008) models the equilibrium distribution of trading between a domestic market and a cross-listing 
market with partially overlapping trading hours.10 Menkveld combines Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) 
intuition that traders tend to concentrate their trades during certain times with Chowdhry and Nanda’s 
(1991) model of multimarket trading. He predicts that if there are some non-discretionary liquidity traders 
in each market, discretionary liquidity traders and informed traders will split their trades across markets 
                                                     
10 For example, the London Stock Exchange is open from 8:00 to 16:30 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) while the New York 
Stock Exchange is open from 14:30 to 21:00 GMT (9:30 to 16:00 Eastern time), producing a two-hour overlap.   
- 7 - 
and concentrate their trades during overlapping trading hours. Empirical evidence of investors splitting 
their trades across domestic and cross-listing markets to minimize their price impact is presented by 
Chakravarty, Chiyachantana, and Jiang (2011) and by Menkveld (2008), who documents order-splitting 
by both informed traders and large liquidity traders.  
When there are frictions such as differential trading costs between markets, traders may be motivated 
to trade in both the domestic and cross-listing markets for many different reasons. Sophisticated traders 
may trade similar assets in different markets in search of the most liquid venue to exploit their 
informational advantages (Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)), to strategically enhance those advantages 
(Pasquariello and Vega (2010)), or to exploit delays in the market’s reaction to related information 
(Cohen and Frazzini (2008)). Traders may also be motivated to allocate their trading among similar assets 
because of rebalancing considerations (Kodres and Pritsker (2002)), information asymmetry (King and 
Wadhwani (1990)), financial constraints (Kyle and Xiong (2001), Yuan (2005)), or strategic 
considerations (Caballe and Krishnan (1994), Pasquariello (2007)).  
Arbitrage opportunities can provide an additional motivation for sophisticated traders to engage in 
multimarket trading (Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007)). Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a) document that 
mispricings between the shares of the same firm trading in its domestic market and a cross-listing market 
occasionally occur (see also Chan, Hong and Subrahmanyam (2008)), and Menkveld (2008) finds 
evidence of arbitrage activity in intraday trading. Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a) also find that arbitrage is 
impeded by institutional and informational barriers that prevent arbitrageurs from fully eliminating 
mispricings between markets. 
Although sophisticated traders potentially trade in multiple markets to increase their welfare, that 
does not imply that trading volumes should be the same in domestic and cross-listing markets. The 
equilibrium distribution of trading volume may be all in one market, all in the other, or any distribution in 
between. But all types of multimarket trading should contribute to a positive correlation in trading volume 
shocks, or unexpected trading volume, in domestic and cross-listed shares if there is a demand to trade by 
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discretionary traders and each market has some non-discretionary traders, i.e., there are some investors 
who trade only the domestic or only the cross-listed shares.11 From these predictions we construct the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Multimarket trading should lead to a positive correlation between trading volume 
shocks in a firm’s domestic and cross-listed shares.  
Multimarket trading is not the only possible cause of a positive correlation between trading volume 
shocks in two markets. The main alternative hypothesis is that positive correlation could be driven by 
correlated trading needs of captive investors who each trade in only one market. Such correlation in 
trading needs might be driven by investors’ reactions to public firm-specific news or common economic 
shocks across markets. The correlation of trading volume shocks is an appropriate measure of 
multimarket trading only if it reflects multimarket trading, not merely correlated trading needs. A key 
difference is that if the positive correlation between trading volume shocks is driven by multimarket 
trading, the degree of correlation should be related to the presence of barriers to and benefits from 
multimarket trading, which should not affect trading driven purely by correlated trading needs in the two 
markets. We thus formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: If the correlation between trading volume shocks on the domestic and cross-listing 
markets is driven by multimarket trading, it should vary with the barriers and benefits to multimarket 
trading.  
In a world where all discretionary trading is split across markets to interact with non-discretionary 
traders in different markets, the correlation should be higher than when barriers discourage trade-splitting 
and arbitrage across markets. Thus we expect trading volume shock correlations to be lower (higher) 
when there are greater barriers (potential benefits) to multimarket trading across the domestic and cross-
listing markets. For example, if the trading hours in the domestic and cross-listing markets overlap very 
                                                     
11 JPMorgan (2003) finds evidence that some investors trade only cross-listed shares and some investors trade only domestic 
shares of firms located outside the U.S.  
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little, it is more difficult to minimize price impact by trading in both markets, to exploit delays in the 
market's reaction to related information, or to exploit temporary mispricings through arbitrage.  
III. Sample and Data  
A. Sample  
We begin with the home-market and cross-listed shares of all firms whose common stock is cross-
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or the American Stock Exchange at any time 
between 1980 and 2001. Because the theoretical basis for both trade-splitting and arbitrage relies on 
simultaneous trading in the domestic and cross-listing markets, we include in our sample only firms for 
which domestic and cross-listing market trading hours overlap. Our sample is further limited to stocks for 
which daily trading volume and price data in both the domestic and the cross-listing market are available 
from Thompson Financial Datastream and Reuters Equity 3000, and both the domestic and cross-listed 
stocks have enough daily trading data to allow estimation. Our resulting sample includes 361 firms from 
24 countries; descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The largest number of firms in our sample are 
from Canada (186 firms) and the U.K. (48 firms). Daily dollar trading volume is higher in the domestic 
market than in the cross-listing market for most countries, with notable exceptions including Ireland, 
Israel, and several Latin American countries. 
[Table 1 Here] 
B. Trading Volume 
For each cross-listed company each day, we calculate the daily U.S. dollar volume on the domestic 
and the cross-listing market as the number of shares traded times the closing price, converting domestic-
currency values to U.S. dollars at the daily closing foreign exchange rate from Thompson Financial 
Datastream and Reuters Equity 3000. By calculating volume in dollars rather than in shares, we 
automatically adjust for the American Depositary Receipt (ADR) ratio, since the ADR price reflects the 
number of domestic shares represented by the ADR. All of our results are robust to an alternative 
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specification that uses the number of shares traded per day as the measure of volume; results are available 
on request. Analyzing daily changes within each market resolves the issue of the ADR ratios in this case.  
IV. Trading Volume Shock Correlations  
The hypotheses we want to test most naturally apply to shocks in trading volume (unexpected trading 
volume) rather than to the level of trading volume. We use a Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework to 
model expected trading volume in one market as a function of past trading volume in both markets; the 
residual from each equation captures the trading volume shocks, or unexpected volume, in that market. In 
the VAR we want to control for unexpected volume that may be unrelated to multimarket trading. We do 
not want to control for factors such as commonality in liquidity in the VAR, because they are likely to be 
associated with the multimarket trading we are trying to detect. In particular, for each firm i each year, we 
estimate the following VAR from trading volume measured at the daily frequency, t:  
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where TVoli,t is the trading volume change, measured as the logarithm of the ratio of day t to day t-1 
dollar trading volume.12 We use trading volume changes to achieve stationarity because daily volume 
tends to be quite persistent (see, for example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Sanders and 
Zdanowicz (1992)).13 The superscript DOM denotes the domestic market and the superscript CL denotes 
the cross-listing market. The numbers of lags, K and L, are determined per firm and per year using the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Our four Control variables are designed to control for unexpected 
volume that may be unrelated to multimarket trading. Our first control variable is the firm’s stock return 
                                                     
12 Ajinkya and Jain (1989) find that raw trading volume data are highly non-normal, so they recommend performing studies on 
the log transformed variable. 
13 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests confirm that our transformed volume variable is stationary. Robustness tests using the 
logarithm of trading volume instead of volume changes yields qualitatively similar results, which are available upon request.  
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in the domestic market, since daily volumes may be driven by local investors in both markets 
simultaneously receiving a firm-specific signal (such as an information event) and trading on it locally. 
Similarly, our second and third control variables are the log change of market-wide daily dollar volume 
for the domestic market and the cross-listing market. These variables control for aggregate information 
(macroeconomic news) or other market-wide events that might also induce some correlation in firm-
specific volume shocks without multimarket trading necessarily occurring. Our fourth control variable is 
the daily currency return between the two markets, in case exchange rate dynamics are responsible for 
some apparent volume shocks (recall that volume in both markets is measured in U.S. dollars). 14, 15  
Table 2 reports average statistics for the VAR described in Equations (1) and (2). We model the 
daily change in trading volume for each firm each year. For brevity we report the coefficients for only the 
first lag of each variable; each model includes up to four lags, determined by the AIC.  
[Table 2 Here] 
Table 2 highlights several interesting characteristics of trading volume dynamics in a multimarket 
context. First, autocorrelation coefficients are negative, reflecting the mean-reverting pattern of trading 
volume. These average autocorrelation coefficients are similar for the domestic and cross-listing markets. 
Second, cross-market correlation coefficients are on average smaller and less significant than 
autocorrelation coefficients and are positive in each equation. The positive mean coefficients imply that 
on average there are positive spill-over effects between the two markets. Third, the VARs perform 
reasonably well in explaining multimarket trading volume dynamics. On average, the VARs explain 39% 
and 34% of the variation of daily trading volume changes for the domestic and cross-listing markets.  
We are interested in whether a trading volume shock in one market is related to the trading volume 
                                                     
14 To the extent that these controls, especially firm-specific returns and market volume, are not completely independent from 
multimarket trading, including them in the VAR biases our subsequent analysis against finding evidence of multimarket trading. 
15 As a robustness check, we also include day-of-the-week dummies as additional control variables in the VAR (Sanders and 
Zdanowicz (1992), Ajinka and Jain (1989), and Meulbroek (1990)). Our results are unaffected by the addition of day-of-the-week 
dummies, so for conciseness we omit them from our main specification. Results are available from the authors on request.  
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shock in the other market on the same day. Therefore our main variable of interest is not simply the 
unexpected trading volume in each market, i,t, but rather the contemporaneous correlation between the 
unexpected trading volumes in the two markets.16 We calculate yearly correlations between the 
unexpected trading volume in the domestic and the cross-listing markets, resulting in an unbalanced panel 
of correlations, with one correlation for each firm each year. Table 3 summarizes these correlations by the 
percentage of overlap in the trading hours of the cross-listing to the domestic market. On average, the 
correlation between volume shocks in the two markets is 0.28, and it is generally increasing in the amount 
of overlap.17 Overall, 88% of the correlations are significant at the 5% level.18 We include all correlations 
in the following analyses; for robustness we also replicate our results using only the significant 
correlations and find similar results (results available on request). These correlations provide strong 
support for our first hypothesis, that trading volume shocks in a firm’s domestic stock market should be 
positively correlated with trading volume shocks in the cross-listing market. In the following section we 
examine whether these correlations reflect multimarket trading.  
[Table 3 Here] 
V. Barriers and Benefits to Multimarket Trading   
In this section we analyze the relation between trading volume shock correlations and barriers and 
potential benefits to multimarket trading, to establish whether the correlated trading volume shocks reflect 
multimarket trading.  
A. Measures and Predicted Signs 
In our sample of stock markets, there are no explicit governmental barriers to multimarket trading. 
                                                     
16 Note that a VAR model is correctly specified even if contemporaneous errors are correlated (see Greene (2003)). It becomes 
mis-specified only if there is correlation across time (for example, if errors are serially correlated).  
17 In separate tests, we examine the correlation of trading volume shocks for markets with no overlapping trading hours. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions that the correlations are related to simultaneous trading, the non-overlapping markets 
exhibit correlations that are considerably lower and less significant.  
18 Significance is determined using Fisher’s z-transformation. If c denotes the correlation and n denotes the degrees of freedom, 
then the test statistic t = n1/2  ln[(1+c)/(1-c)] is distributed approximately N(0,1).  
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Thus the barriers and benefits we consider are factors that arise from market structure, the regulatory 
environment, and firm-specific characteristics; the calculation of each variable and the logic behind its 
predicted sign are explained in the Appendix. At the market level, we expect that a greater overlap in 
trading hours, more total market volume, stronger protection against insider trading, and the 
permissibility of short sales would be associated with higher correlations in volume shocks, as they all 
make it easier for multimarket traders to trade in both markets. In contrast, higher trading cost differences 
or trading costs in total, more unequal trading volumes on the two markets, and more different market 
designs may discourage multimarket trading and thus lead to lower volume shock correlations. At the 
firm level, the more illiquid a firm's stock is on each market and the more unequal the firm's trading 
volume is on the two markets, the lower the correlation we expect between volume shocks. In contrast, 
we expect that at the firm level a higher correlation between the stock's return and the cross-listing 
market's return, a higher Baruch-Karolyi-Lemmon relative information measure (Baruch, Karolyi, and 
Lemmon (2007)), higher U.S. institutional shareholdings (by percentage or number), higher foreign sales, 
and a firm's belonging to the technology sector would all lead to higher correlation between the trading 
volume shocks. Table 4 summarizes the expected influence of each proxy for market- or firm-level 
barriers and benefits on multimarket trading, as captured by our volume shock correlation measure. 
[Table 4 Here] 
Table 5 examines the correlations between all the variables. The first column presents correlations 
between our measure of trading volume shock correlations (CorrVolChange), proxies for market-level 
and firm-level barriers and benefits to multimarket trading, and control variables. Most of the market-
level and firm-level variables (the first 16 rows) display significant correlations with CorrVolChange, and 
the signs are consistent with the predictions in Table 4. However, the control variables (last three rows) 
are also highly correlated with CorrVolChange and many of the explanatory variables are highly 
correlated with each other, so we next examine the relations in a multivariate framework to assess their 
relative explanatory power.  
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[Table 5 Here] 
B. Regression Results 
We estimate the following equation using a random effects regression with robust standard errors:19 
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where CorrVolChangei,t is the trading volume shock correlation based on changes for stock i in year t, 
MktLevelVar is the set of market-level variables, FirmLevelVar is the set of firm-level variables, and 
ControlVar is the set of control variables in Table 2. We include a series of calendar-year dummy 
variables, Year, to control for the general increase in integration over our sample period (discussed in 
Section VI). Since we control for this time trend in our econometric specification, our empirical results 
explain the trading volume shock correlations in excess of this pure time trend. All explanatory variables 
except indicator variables are scaled by their standard deviations, so coefficient estimates provide a sense 
of the explanatory variables’ relative impact. We also estimate the regression with subsets of the 
explanatory variables.20  
The results from estimating Equation (3) and specifications including subsets of the explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 6. Specification 1 focuses on the market-level explanatory variables. The 
significantly positive coefficient estimates on trading hours overlap and short sale permissibility and 
significantly negative coefficient estimate on market design differences are all consistent with our 
                                                     
19 Estimations from a pooled OLS regression with year fixed effects and Rogers standard errors clustered on firm, as in Petersen 
(2009), and a pooled OLS regression with standard errors double-clustered on firm and year, as in Thompson (2011), yield 
qualitatively similar results, which are available on request.  
20 As robustness checks, we run the same regression for the subsample excluding Canadian firms (approximately 50% of the full 
sample) and separate cross-sectional regressions each year. Estimations yield qualitatively similar results, which are available on 
request. When we include foreign exchange volatility as an additional explanatory variable as a robustness check, its coefficient 
estimate is insignificant and other coefficient estimates are unchanged. To eliminate potential endogeneity, we also estimate 
equation (3) lagging firm-specific characteristics by one year, which does not change our results. Details of all robustness checks 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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predictions of how market-level barriers should affect trading volume shock correlations, as outlined in 
Table 4. Of these barriers, trading hours overlap has the largest relative effect. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in trading hours overlap increases the trading volume shock correlation by 0.06 on average, over 
20 percent of the average correlation of 0.28. A difference in market design creates statistically significant 
barriers between the two markets and decreases the correlation of trading volume shocks by about 0.02. 
Specification 1, which includes only market-level explanatory variables, explains 35% of the variation in 
the correlation of trading volume shocks between domestic and cross-listing markets.  
[Table 6 Here] 
Specifications 2 and 3 focus on the firm-level barriers and benefits to multimarket trading and also 
include firm-level control variables. Because foreign sales is a sparsely-populated variable, we exclude it 
in Specification 3, which expands the number of firm-year observations by about 40%. Excluding foreign 
sales as an explanatory variable does not change the signs of any other coefficient estimates. Coefficients 
on all of the firm-level proxies for barriers and benefits to multimarket trading have the predicted signs 
and many are significant. Lower values of the US Amihud illiquidity measure and a ratio of firm volume 
across markets that is closer to one (lower FirmVolumeIndex) are associated with higher trading volume 
correlations (negative coefficients), while the coefficient estimates on the domestic Amihud measure are 
insignificant, most likely because of multicollinearity with the US Amihud measure (Table 5). Similarly, 
a higher BKL measure, more U.S. institutional investors (SharesUS and NumberUS), and being in the 
technology sector are positively related to volume shock correlations. On average, the trading volume 
shocks of technology firms are 0.05 more correlated than non-technology firms (from specification 3). 
Firm-level explanatory variables explain 25 to 32 percent of the variation in trading volume shock 
correlations between domestic and cross-listing markets, depending on whether foreign sales are included 
as an explanatory variable.  
Specification 4 includes market-level and firm-level explanatory variables, omitting the foreign sales 
variable to maximize the sample size. The results from the first three specifications are consistent with 
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those in the full specification, with market-level and firm-level variables remaining consequential for 
trading volume correlations. Including both market-level and firm-level variables raises the explanatory 
power to an R-squared of 48 percent. Taken together, these results provide strong support for our second 
hypothesis that the correlation between trading volume shocks on the domestic and cross-listing markets 
varies with the level of barriers and benefits to multimarket trading.  
Specification 5 extends Specification 4 by also including the lagged dependent variable. Because the 
volume shock correlation is an autoregressive process, including the lagged dependent variable increases 
the R-squared to 59%. Adding the lagged dependent variable to the specification also controls for the 
lagged effect of any variables omitted in the first four specifications. We note that the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable leaves all of our previous results and conclusions unchanged.  
The relations between the correlation of trading volume shocks and barriers and benefits to 
multimarket trading suggest that the correlations are not driven by correlated trading needs of investors 
who only trade in one of the two markets but not in both. Rather, the results in this section suggest that 
the correlation of trading volume shocks reflects multimarket trading, indicating the extent to which 
traders treat separate markets as one integrated market. In the following section we examine what these 
correlations suggest about integration for different countries and over time.  
VI. Multimarket Trading and Integration 
The main goal of this paper is to use trading volume shock correlations to investigate the degree of 
multimarket trading among international financial markets. Multimarket trading is also likely to be related 
to integration, although they are not perfectly overlapping notions. In this section, we examine to what 
extent our multimarket trading measure is distinct from or overlaps with measures of price integration and 
measures of barriers to broadly defined financial integration.  
A. Evidence on Price Integration 
We begin by aggregating our firm-specific measures to market-level measures by country and then 
- 17 - 
group them by emerging versus developed countries. Table 7 presents the average trading volume shock 
correlations for groups of stocks. Panel A presents the average trading volume shock correlations grouped 
by stocks whose domestic markets are emerging versus developed. Because several countries, including 
all the emerging markets, have data available only from 1990 on, we divide our sample period into three 
sub-periods: 1980-1989 (fewer markets available) and two equal-length periods during which data are 
available for most countries: 1990-1995 and 1996-2001. Over the full sample period (1980-2001, third 
and fourth columns), emerging markets have lower correlations in their volume shocks than developed 
markets. Looking at the last two sub-periods, however, yields a richer picture. Whereas in the 1990-1995 
sub-period the average volume shock correlations in the emerging markets is 0.18, in the 1996-2001 sub-
period the average correlation is 0.25, an increase of 39% percent. Meanwhile the developed markets’ 
volume shock correlation average remains around 0.30 in both sub-periods.  
[Table 7 Here] 
Figure 1 provides a more detailed picture of the convergence in developed and emerging market 
trading volume shock correlations over time. The graph shows that the level of multimarket trading has 
increased dramatically in emerging markets, nearly catching up with the developed markets by 2001. Our 
finding of increasing multimarket trading for emerging markets over the period and higher multimarket 
trading among developed markets is consistent with the index- and factor-based price integration 
measures of Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) (Figure 1) and Pukhuanthong and Roll (2009) 
(Figure 4).21  
[Figure 1 Here] 
Panel B of Table 7 compares the average volume shock correlations for the countries in our sample 
that have more than 10 firms each: four developed countries (Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the 
                                                     
21 Aggregating trading volume shock correlations by industry also confirms Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel’s (2008) and 
Pukhuanthong and Roll’s (2009) asset-pricing based findings of high integration in the services industry and low but increasing 
integration in banking; however, our analysis suggests that these industry results reflect the concentration of industry cross-
listings from certain home markets rather than specific industry characteristics.   
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U.K.) and three emerging countries (Chile, Israel and South Africa). Canada has the highest correlation of 
trading volume shocks, and the correlation remains constant across the sample periods. The remaining 
developed countries show similar levels of volume shock correlations. In contrast to Canada, however, 
these countries experience increases in correlations (e.g., 40% for Netherlands and 33% for France). 
Chile, surprisingly, shows levels of volume shock correlations that exceed those of the developed 
countries except for Canada. Israel experiences a remarkable increase in correlations of 119% across the 
sample periods, indicative of a greater integration in its market across time.22 South Africa shows by far 
the lowest level of integration and also experiences only a small increase during the 1990s.  
These results are generally consistent with studies of price integration. For example, Bekaert, 
Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) show a comparable ranking of countries with respect to their 
measure of segmentation, echo our finding that Chile’s integration is comparable to many developed 
countries (see also Carrieri, Errunza and Hogan (2007)), and also document sharp increases in integration 
over the sample period. But our analysis also uncovers some notable differences. In particular, our 
multimarket trading measure reveals a larger gap between Canada and other developed markets and a 
dramatic increase in multimarket trading for Israel during the 1990s. 
Our multimarket trading measure could simply be capturing the extent of price parity among cross-
listing markets. To further investigate this issue we compare our volume shock correlations to the price 
disparity measure of Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a).23 Figure 2 presents the two measures over time for a 
sample of four countries (Canada, the U.K., Chile, and France) that illustrate a range of relations between 
price disparity and multimarket trading. There is considerable cross-sectional variation in the link 
between price disparities and volume shock correlations. For example, the top row shows that although 
                                                     
22 Israel was classified as an emerging market during our entire sample period, but in 2010 was reclassified as a developed market 
by equity index builders such as MSCI. 
23 We thank Louis Gagnon and Andrew Karolyi for providing us with a daily time series of price disparities on a country level. 
We transform these time series into absolute values because we are not concerned about the direction of any mispricing, and we 
use yearly averages in our analysis. 
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Canada and the U.K. have nearly identical levels of price disparity,24 the level of volume shock 
correlations is approximately twice as high in Canada as in the U.K. Although both countries are well 
integrated with the U.S. from a pricing perspective, they have very different levels of multimarket trading. 
In contrast, Chile exhibits a negative correlation between price disparities and volume correlation, while 
in France the price disparity stays at a relatively constant level but volume correlation nearly doubles over 
a 10-year period. In general, what is consistent across countries is the evidence that countries with high 
levels of multimarket trading exhibit small price discrepancies. Thus to understand the extent to which 
traders treat different markets as one market, we need to look beyond traditional measures of price parity 
and also examine the extent to which trading volume shocks are correlated.  
[Figure 2 Here] 
B. Evidence on Broadly-Defined Measures of Financial Integration 
In addition to comparing our multimarket trading measure to measures of price integration, we also 
relate it to measures of barriers to financial integration, namely market openness (Chinn and Ito (2008)) 
and capital controls (Edison and Warnock (2003)).25 Table 8 presents the results and focuses on time 
trends of their measures and our multimarket trading variable across the two subperiods 1990-1995 and 
1996-2001. Looking at the regional trends, our study agrees with both the Chinn-Ito (2008) index and the 
Edison and Warnock (2003) measure: There is a significant increase in financial integration (214.29% 
increase in market openness, 45.65% decrease in capital controls) across time among developing markets. 
Surprisingly, the Chinn-Ito index also shows a significant increase among developed markets, which our 
measure of multimarket trading does not find.  
Some similarities can also be found on the individual country level. The Chinn-Ito index shows an 
                                                     
24 Canada and the U.K. are also very similarly integrated with the U.S. according to other measures of market integration. For 
example, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) estimate segmentation measures (i.e., absolute values of the difference 
between industry valuation ratios) of 2.3% for Canada and 1.9% for the U.K. 
25 We thank Menzie Chinn, Hiro Ito, Hali Edison, and Frank Warnock for making their measures available for this analysis.  
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increase in market openness for France, Chile, and Israel, while the Edison-Warnock proxy shows a 
decrease in capital controls for Chile and South Africa. These patterns are consistent with the ones we 
find for multimarket trading.  
[Table 8 Here] 
Overall, these results support the idea that price integration and multimarket trading are related but 
non-redundant measures of financial market integration. Our measure of volume shock correlations is also 
related to measures of market openness and capital controls in a consistent way. These diverse measures 
of financial integration overlap, but not completely; each one adds a different dimension to the broadly-
defined notion of financial integration. Our measure, for example, captures not only arbitrage-based 
trading – key for price parity – but also other motivations for multimarket trading, including liquidity and 
information-based trading of investors with discretion over their trading location. By characterizing the 
ease of trading across markets, our measure of multimarket trading provides a different, volume-based 
perspective on market integration.  
VII. Multimarket Trading and Post-Cross-Listing Liquidity Improvements 
In this section we explore one specific context in which our multimarket trading measure can be 
applied: liquidity improvements for stocks after cross-listing. In Section 5, we document that firm 
liquidity and the extent of multimarket trading are positively linked (that is, cross-listings which have a 
lot of multimarket trading also have low Amihud illiquidity measure in the cross-listing market). In this 
section, we examine a different aspect of this relation through an event study, looking at changes in a 
firm’s stock liquidity before and after it cross-lists. Our conjecture is that the liquidity improvement of a 
firm initiating a cross listing is positively related to the extent to which investors engage in multimarket 
trading after the cross-listing. This positive relation may arise either because multimarket trading is easier 
and cheaper for more liquid domestic/cross-listed pairs of stocks or because multimarket trading 
magnifies the liquidity benefits of cross-listing. 
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A substantial literature documents that cross listing improves a stock’s liquidity (see Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2010b) for a comprehensive survey). We estimate the following base case panel regression to 
compare pre-cross-listing and post-cross-listing medians controlling for firm fixed effects, using the 
Amihud (2002) measure as our proxy for liquidity: 
(4) .,,, tiititi CLAmihud      
Before a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. market we calculate the domestic Amihud measure using 
returns and dollar trading volume from the domestic market. After the cross-listing we estimate the 
Amihud measure using two different specifications: 1) the domestic Amihud measure, and 2) the volume-
weighted average of the domestic and the U.S. Amihud measures. We average each measure per 
firm/year. CL is a dummy that equals 1 after the cross-listing and 0 otherwise. We create a strongly 
balanced panel by using pre-and post-cross-listing median values in our empirical analysis (using five 
years of annual observations before and after the cross-listing event). Thus the time subscript t is either 
pre-cross-listing or post-cross-listing for each firm. 
From the cross-listing literature, we expect that β in Equation (4) is negative because we expect 
illiquidity to decrease (liquidity to increase) after a firm cross-lists in the U.S. More specifically, we test 
whether this liquidity increase varies with the level of multimarket trading that takes place for a specific 
firm after the cross-listing. Thus, we estimate the above regression separately for firms with above 
median (High) and below median (Low) values of multimarket trading. Then we test whether βHigh is 
smaller than βLow, implying a larger reduction in illiquidity (increase in liquidity) after the cross-listing 
when there is more multimarket trading.  
Table 9 reports the results for tests of the relation between liquidity improvements and multimarket 
trading as well as for relations between liquidity improvements and other firm and market characteristics. 
We report results for both of our post-cross-listing liquidity measures: domestic Amihud (Panel A) and 
volume-weighted Amihud (Panel B). We are interested in whether there is a positive relation between 
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multimarket trading and liquidity improvement. We thus evaluate whether our measure of multimarket 
trading provides a clear separation of firms that have more versus less liquidity improvement following 
cross-listing. We also compare the separation provided by multimarket trading to that provided by other 
characteristics that have been previously documented as being linked to liquidity. 
[Table 9 Here] 
The first two rows of Panel A of Table 9 show that stocks with high multimarket trading after cross-
listing have significantly larger improvements in liquidity (that is, a larger drop in Amihud illiquidity), 
while stocks with low multimarket trading have no significant change in liquidity. The Chow test in the 
last column shows that this difference is significant, with a p-value of 5.3%. The results appear stronger if 
we consider the volume-weighted Amihud measure in Panel B. In this case, the p-value of the Chow test 
comparing improvements in liquidity between stocks with high and low multimarket trading is 3.3%. 
Multimarket trading clearly distinguishes between firms that increase their liquidity through cross-listing 
and those that do not, although these tests cannot determine cause and effect. The remaining rows of 
Table 9 show the results from analogous tests in which stocks are separated by other characteristics that 
have been linked to liquidity improvements for cross-listing firms. In contrast to the clean distinction 
revealed by multimarket trading, splits by other characteristics yield beta coefficients that are negative 
(indicating liquidity improvements, though not all significant) for both the "high" and "low" categories, 
and only the number of U.S. institutional investors (NumberUS) produces a Chow test that is significant 
at the 5% level.  
Overall, the results of Table 9 provide evidence that there is a strong association between liquidity 
improvements and multimarket trading. This has implications not only for companies interested in cross-
listing, but also for regulators and exchanges that care about market share and order flow.  
VIII. Conclusion  
Price and quantity are the building blocks of all theories of market interactions, yet the behavior of 
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trading volume has received far less attention than the behavior of prices (Lo and Wang (2000, 2010)). By 
examining the correlation of trading volume shocks in pairs of domestic and cross-listed stocks, we 
introduce a new measure of multimarket trading. Our trade-based multimarket trading measure is simple 
and model-free, and it complements existing price-based integration concepts.  
Our results have potentially important implications for firms considering cross-listing and for firms 
evaluating existing cross-listings. If a firm’s goal is to provide a larger global trading environment, its 
ability to achieve a well-integrated domestic and cross-listing market for its stock depends on the 
characteristics of the two markets and the specific firm. The existing literature on cross-listings (e.g., 
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a)) and on market integration (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel 
(2011)) does not address these issues.  
Our results also have potential implications for the competition across countries and exchanges for 
order flow. An increasing number of stocks are traded on multiple markets, not only via international 
cross-listings but also through direct trading of the same stock on multiple venues.26 Multimarket trading 
is expanding rapidly in the U.S. and in Europe (e.g., O’Hara and Ye (2010) and Foucault and Menkveld 
(2008)). Thus all market participants, including issuers, traders, and providers of trading services, must 
deal with issues of multimarket trading and integration across multiple trading platforms. Our measure 
can be easily used to identify cross-sectional differences across firms within a country or region. 
Moreover, it can be used to examine whether regulatory and technological changes affect the level of 
multimarket trading. For example, do changes such as Reg NMS and the “trade-through rule” or the 
development of algorithmic trading result in greater multimarket trading? We leave investigation of such 
issues for future research.  
 
                                                     
26 For example, the share volume of NYSE-listed equity securities executed on the NASDAQ book as a percentage of 
consolidated market volume was 14.2% in June 2009. The monthly market share press release can be found at 
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=397502.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 summarizes the motivation and definition of each variable employed in the multiple regression 
analysis. All variables are measured annually. 
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Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics per country for the sample of 361 firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. over the period 1980-2001; not all firms are present in the sample in all years. Mean values are 
reported in the table, with means calculated in two steps: first, by averaging the variables over time (using 
daily observations for trading volumes, annual observations for remaining variables) for each firm; 
second, by averaging firm means within each country.  
 
Home 
Market 
Overlap  
in 
Hours 
Number of 
Firms 
Domestic Trading 
Volume 
 in USD 
Cross-listed Trading 
Volume 
 in USD 
Foreign 
Sales  
in % 
Assets 
in USD 
million  
Argentina 6.00 5 1,157 10,859 3 6,008 
Belgium 2.00 1 18,655 415 n/a 9,378 
Brazil 6.50 2 4,601,056 99,542 0 11,160 
Canada 6.50 186 3,237 2,589 50 4,718 
Chile 6.50 12 448 972 27 3,225 
Colombia 2.50 1 55 267 n/a 3,343 
Denmark 1.50 2 7,560 973 59 2,385 
Finland 1.83 2 171,978 170,942 50 10,260 
France 2.00 14 41,772 7,361 61 40,610 
Germany 4.50 6 245,103 7,319 45 43,890 
Ireland 2.00 4 4,589 26,452 73 4,803 
Israel 0.50 15 944 4,164 52 1,075 
Italy 2.00 5 67,699 1,281 52 15,670 
Mexico 6.50 6 1,195 1,784 22 1,956 
Netherlands 2.00 17 50,775 14,103 64 38,950 
Norway 1.00 4 8,389 2,609 66 8,308 
Peru 4.00 3 895 2,477 8 4,254 
Portugal 3.00 1 14,926 392 n/a 13,710 
South Africa 0.50 13 4,029 1,195 3 1,572 
Spain 2.00 3 43,853 3,938 26 55,480 
Sweden 2.00 7 34,155 16,214 81 7,467 
Switzerland 2.00 2 3,269 407 76 933 
U.K. 2.00 48 40,028 6,124 59 24,150 
Venezuela 4.50 2 217 684 14 424 
Total 4.52 361 40,970 5,606 51 12,050 
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Table 2. Summary of VAR Results 
This table reports average statistics for the VAR estimated for the domestic and the cross-
listed trading volume of each firm each year. The dependent variables are the log of the ratio of 
day t to day t-1 domestic dollar trading volume (DomesticVolChg) and the log of the ratio of 
day t to day t-1 foreign dollar trading volume (CrossListVolChg). We report means and standard 
deviations of the coefficients and of the individual p-values of the coefficients. For brevity we 
report only the first lags. The number of lags is determined per firm and per year using the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). VARs also include the following exogenous variables: 
stock returns, foreign exchange returns of the domestic currency with respect to the USD, the 
log of the ratio of day t to day t-1 domestic total dollar trading volume and the log of the ratio of 
day t to day t-1 foreign total dollar trading volume. For brevity we do not report the coefficients 
of these exogenous variables. 
 
  Trading Volume Changes 
  DomesticVolChgt CrossListVolChgt 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Coeff 
D
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V
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hg
t-1
 
-0.51 0.16 0.05 0.21 
P-Value 0.01 0.06 0.42 0.31 
Coeff 
C
ro
ss
Li
st
V
ol
C
hg
t- 1
 
0.07 0.13 -0.56 0.14 
P-Value 0.37 0.31 0.01 0.05 
R-Squared 0.39 0.11 0.34 0.09 
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Table 3. Correlation of Residuals by Overlap of Trading Hours 
This table reports average correlations and standard deviations across markets with 
different trading-hour overlaps (in percent of the domestic trading hours). The correlations are 
yearly correlations calculated from the daily residuals (shocks) of VARs. We report correlations 
based on VARs that use the log of the ratio of day t to day t-1 domestic and foreign trading 
volume (CorrVolChange) as dependent variables. VARs also include the following exogenous 
variables: stock returns, foreign exchange returns of the local currency on the domestic market 
with respect to the USD, the log of the ratio of day t to day t-1 domestic total dollar trading 
volume and the log of the ratio of day t to day t-1 foreign total dollar trading volume. The 
column “Sig 5%” reports the percentage of trading volume shock correlations that are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. There are no market pairs with trading hours 
overlap between 50% and 75%. 
 
Percentage Number of CorrVolChange 
Overlap Domestic Countries Mean SD Sig 5% 
Less than 25% 5 0.15 0.13 75% 
25% to less than 50% 11 0.18 0.13 83% 
More than 75% 8 0.38 0.17 94% 
Total 24 0.28 0.18 88% 
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Table 4. Explanatory Variables and Predicted Signs 
This table summarizes the expected influence of each proxy for market- or firm-level 
barriers and benefits on trading volume shock correlations. 
 
Explanatory variable (abbreviation) 
Predicted effect on  
trading volume shock 
correlation 
Market-Level  
Trading hours overlap (Overlap) + 
Trading cost difference (TCostDiff) - 
Trading cost sum (TCostComb) - 
Dollar trading volume on cross-listing/domestic market, measured as absolute 
deviation from one (MarketVolumeIndex) - 
Total dollar trading volume on cross-listing and domestic market 
(MarketVolumeComb) + 
Protection against insider trading in the domestic market  (ITProtect) + 
Short sales permitted (ShortSale) + 
Market design different (MktDesignDiff) - 
Firm-Level  
Domestic and US Amihud illiquidity measures (DomesticAmihud, USAmihud) - 
Firm’s dollar trading volume on cross-listing/domestic market, measured as 
absolute deviation from one (FirmVolumeIndex)  
Stock return correlation to cross-listing market’s return (CLCorr) + 
Baruch-Karolyi-Lemmon relative information measure (BKLMeasure) + 
Percentage of shares held by U.S. institutions (SharesUS)  + 
Number of U.S. institutions invested in the firm (NumberUS) + 
Fraction of firm’s sales from foreign markets (ForSales) + 
Technology sector (TechSec) + 
Control Variables  
Firm size (Size)  
Idiosyncratic volatility (StockVolatility)   
Absolute yearly stock return (Return)  
Years since first cross-listed (CLAge)  
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix  
This table summarizes correlations between volume shock correlations and potential explanatory variables. CorrVolChange is the correlation 
of trading volume shocks from the VAR using daily trading volume changes in the domestic and the cross-listing markets. Overlap is percentage 
of domestic market trading hours that overlap with cross-listing market trading hours; TCostDiff is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
the absolute difference between total trading costs on the domestic and cross-listing markets is above the median value of market pairs, else zero; 
TCostComb is the sum of the total trading costs for domestic and cross-listing markets; MarketVolumeIndex is the log of the absolute difference 
between one and the ratio of total dollar trading volume (for all stocks) on the domestic and cross-listing markets; MarketVolumeComb is the sum 
of total dollar trading volume on the domestic and cross-listing markets; ITProtect is an indicator variable that equals one in year t if insider 
trading laws have been enforced in the home market during or before year t, else zero; ShortSale is an indicator variable equal to one in year t if 
short sales are permitted in that market that year, else zero; MktDesignDiff is an indicator variable that equals one in year t if electronic trading has 
been introduced in either the domestic market or the cross-listing market, but not both, before year t, else zero; DomesticAmihud (USAmihud) is 
the ratio of the absolute stock return in the domestic (US) market to trading volume in the domestic (US) market; FirmVolumeIndex is the log of 
the absolute difference between one and the ratio of the firm’s dollar trading volume on the cross-listing market to the domestic market; CLCorr is 
the stock return correlation to the cross-listing market’s return; BKL Measure is the measure of relative information revelation from Baruch, 
Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007); SharesUS is the percentage of shares held by U.S. institutions; NumberUS is the number of U.S. institutions 
invested in a firm; ForSales is the fraction of foreign sales; TechSec is an indicator variable that equals one for technology-oriented companies, 
else zero; Size is total assets of the firm; StockVolatility is the volatility of the residuals in a regression in which stock returns are regressed on 
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returns of the cross-listing and the domestic market indices; and Return is the stock’s home-currency log price change over the year. Bold 
correlations indicate correlations that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
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Overlap 0.56 1.00                    
TCostDiff -0.14 -0.16 1.00                   
TCostComb -0.08 -0.04 0.89 1.00                  
MarketVolumeIndex -0.40 -0.59 0.09 -0.09 1.00                 
MarketVolumeComb 0.10 0.05 -0.41 -0.63 0.11 1.00                
ITProtect 0.23 0.31 0.00 -0.05 -0.30 0.23 1.00               
ShortSale 0.10 0.06 -0.25 -0.19 -0.59 -0.01 0.13 1.00              
MktDesignDiff -0.15 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 1.00             
DomesticAmihud -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.07 1.00            
USAmihud -0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.23 1.00           
FirmVolumeIndex -0.09 0.10 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 0.22 -0.02 1.00          
CLCorr 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.14 0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 1.00         
BKLMeasure 0.14 -0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.28 1.00        
SharesUS 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.15 0.12 1.00       
NumberUS 0.08 -0.16 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.24 0.06 0.48 1.00      
ForSales 0.09 -0.09 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.14 -0.09 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.18 1.00     
TechSec 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.11 -0.01 -0.18 0.00 -0.03 0.12 0.17 0.07 -0.01 0.11 -0.04 1.00    
Size -0.32 -0.41 0.17 0.15 0.29 -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 0.23 -0.10 -0.16 -0.16 0.33 -0.07 0.08 0.35 0.10 -0.11 1.00   
StockVolatility 0.14 0.13 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.18 0.14 0.07 0.08 -0.20 -0.03 -0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.27 1.00  
Return 0.19 0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 0.18 0.07 0.06 -0.19 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.10 -0.30 0.21 1.00 
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Table 6. Volume Shock Correlations and Multimarket Trading Barriers and Benefits  
This table presents results from regressing firm/year correlations of trading volume shocks 
on proxies for multimarket trading barriers and benefits. The dependent variable is the 
correlation of trading volume shocks from the VAR using daily trading volume changes in the 
domestic and cross-listing markets (CorrVolChange). Overlap is percentage of domestic market 
trading hours that overlap with cross-listing market trading hours; TCostDiff is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the absolute difference between total trading costs on the 
domestic and cross-listing markets is above the median value of market pairs, else zero; 
TCostComb is the sum of the total trading costs for domestic and cross-listing markets; 
MarketVolumeIndex is the log of the absolute difference between one and the ratio of total 
dollar trading volume (for all stocks) on the domestic and cross-listing markets; 
MarketVolumeComb is the sum of total dollar trading volume on the domestic and cross-listing 
markets; ITProtect is an indicator variable that equals one in year t if insider trading laws have 
been enforced in the home market during or before year t, else zero; ShortSale is an indicator 
variable equal to one in year t if short sales are permitted in that market that year, else zero; 
MktDesignDiff is an indicator variable that equals one in year t if electronic trading has been 
introduced in either the domestic market or the cross-listing market, but not both, before year t, 
else zero; DomesticAmihud (USAmihud) is the ratio of the absolute stock return in the domestic 
(US) market to trading volume in the domestic (US) market; FirmVolumeIndex is the log of the 
absolute difference between one and the ratio of the firm’s dollar trading volume on the cross-
listing market to the domestic market; CLCorr is the stock return correlation to the cross-listing 
market’s return; BKL Measure is the measure of relative information revelation from Baruch, 
Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007); SharesUS is the percentage of shares held by U.S. institutions; 
NumberUS is the number of U.S. institutions invested in a firm; ForSales is the fraction of 
foreign sales; TechSec is an indicator variable that equals one for technology-oriented 
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companies, else zero; Size is total assets of the firm; StockVolatility is the volatility of the 
residuals in a regression in which stock returns are regressed on returns of the cross-listing and 
the domestic market indices; Return is the stock’s home-currency log price change over the 
year; and CLAge is the number of years since the firm was first cross-listed. 
All variables except indicator variables are normalized by their standard deviations. All 
specifications include calendar-year fixed effects, not reported, and t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on robust standard errors.  
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  Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 
Overlap 0.06 0.08 0.08 (5.87) (7.77) (8.78) 
TCostDiff -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 (-0.43) (-0.84) (-1.45) 
TcostComb -0.01 0.00 0.00 (-0.83) (-0.35) (0.48) 
MarketVolumeIndex -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 (-1.64) (-1.19) (-1.62) 
MarketVolumeComb 0.15 -0.01 -0.12 (1.71) (-0.08) (-1.42) 
ITProtect 0.01 0.01 0.01 (1.11) (1.13) (0.78) 
ShortSale 0.05 0.05 0.06 (1.74) (1.82) (2.39) 
MktDesignDiff -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 (-2.43) (-2.95) (-1.25) 
DomesticAmihud -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 (-1.26) (-1.32) (0.19) (-0.77) 
USAmihud -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 (-3.50) (-6.46) (-6.49) (-5.86) 
FirmVolumeIndex -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 (-4.64) (-5.36) (-5.61) (-6.13) 
CLCorr 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 (1.37) (1.13) (0.57) (0.74) 
BKLMeasure 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 (2.29) (1.60) (1.98) (1.88) 
SharesUS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 (1.15) (1.43) (1.35) (0.45) 
NumberUS 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 (3.29) (4.26) (4.30) (5.65) 
ForSales 0.01  (1.12)
TechSec 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 (1.56) (2.65) (3.46) (2.81) 
Size -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 (-5.20) (-6.89) (-2.78) (-3.52) 
StockVolatility 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 (3.45) (1.58) (1.04) (1.37) 
Return 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 (3.23) (3.36) (3.13) (3.82) 
CLAge 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 (1.69) (0.76) (2.08) (1.43) 
Lagged Dependent Var. 0.22 (7.38) 
Constant -2.56 0.35 0.41 0.29 2.29 (-1.59) (7.46) (12.48) (0.16) (1.47) 
R-Squared 35% 32% 25% 49% 59% 
Firms 292 212 263 239 222 
Firm Years 1959 1131 1584 1467 1282 
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Table 7. Volume Shock Correlations Across Markets  
This table summarizes trading volume shock correlations (based on the VARs of trading volume changes, CorrVolChange) for emerging 
versus developed countries in Panel A, and for the countries with the largest samples of cross-listed stocks (more than 10 stocks) in Panel B. In 
each case, we report means and standard deviations for the full period 1980-2001 and for three sub-periods, 1980-1989 (most developed market 
data available, no emerging market data available), 1990-1995, and 1996-2001. The reported mean (standard deviation) is the time-series mean 
(standard deviation) of the equal-weighted average volume shock correlations per country or group of countries per year. The last column reports 
the percentage change in trading volume shock correlations across the 1990-1995 and 1996-2001 sub-periods. Significance tests compare the 
given values to zero, with ** and * indicating significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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  1980-2001  1980-1989  1990-1995  1996-2001   
 Firm Years Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean  SD  Mean SD  Change in Correlation: 1990-1995 vs. 1996-2001
               
Panel A: Emerging vs. Developed Countries         
Emerging  245 0.23** 0.17     0.18** 0.17  0.25** 0.16  +38.80%** 
Developed  1855 0.29** 0.18  0.29** 0.18  0.30** 0.20  0.29** 0.18  -3.02% 
               
Panel B: Individual Countries         
Canada 958 0.39** 0.17  0.36** 0.17  0.40** 0.18  0.40** 0.17  -1.74% 
France 77 0.20** 0.14     0.16** 0.10  0.21** 0.14  +32.90% 
Netherlands 149 0.20** 0.12  0.19** 0.15  0.16** 0.12  0.22** 0.11  +40.13%** 
U.K. 407 0.19** 0.12  0.24** 0.14  0.17** 0.11  0.19** 0.12  +10.71% 
Chile 70 0.28** 0.13 0.25** 0.16  0.29** 0.12 +15.42% 
Israel 46 0.18** 0.09     0.08 0.15  0.18** 0.08  +119.28%* 
South Africa 84 0.12** 0.13 0.11** 0.14  0.12** 0.12 +8.77% 
               
All Firms 2100 0.28*** 0.18  0.29*** 0.18  0.28*** 0.20  0.28*** 0.18  -0.01% 
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Table 8. Volume Shock Correlations vs. Measures of Openness 
The first column repeats the last column from the previous table. The remainder of the table shows similar statistics for the Chinn-Ito Index of 
openness and the Edison-Warnock measure of capital controls. The Edison-Warnock measure of capital controls is available for emerging markets 
only. Significance tests compare the given values to zero, with ** and * indicating significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 Volume Shock Correlations Chinn-Ito Index Edison-Warnock 
 Change: 1990-1995 vs. 1996-2001 1990-1995 1996-2001 Change 1990-1995 1996-2001 Change 
Emerging +38.80%** -0.28 0.32 214.29%** 0.46 0.25 -45.65%** 
Developed -3.02% 1.78 2.34 31.46%**    
Canada -1.74% 2.48 2.48 0.00%    
France +32.90% 1.41 2.48 75.89%**    
Netherlands +40.13%** 2.48 2.48 0.00%    
U.K. +10.71% 2.48 2.48 0.00%    
Chile +15.42% -1.46 0.79 154.11%** 0.35 0.14 -60.00%* 
Israel +119.28%* -0.62 1.32 312.90%**  0.01  
South Africa +8.77% -1.09 -1.15 -5.50% 0.02 -0.01 -150.00%**
All -0.01% 1.07 1.67 56.07%**    
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Table 9. Liquidity Changes Around Cross-Listing Events 
The table reports estimates of the effect of cross-listings on the domestic Amihud measure 
(Panel A) and a volume-weighted Amihud measure (Panel B). The Volume-weighted Amihud 
measure weights the post-cross-listing domestic and US Amihud measures by volume in each 
market. The table reports coefficient estimates (Beta) of the panel regression specified in 
equation 4 for subsets of firms which are either above the median (High) or below the median 
(Low) with respect to each of the following characteristic: Multimarket Trading  is the 
correlation of trading volume shocks from the VAR using daily trading volume changes in the 
domestic and the cross-listing markets; FirmVolumeIndex is  the log of the absolute difference 
between one and the ratio of the firm’s dollar trading volume on the cross-listing market to the 
domestic market;  Size is  the total assets of the firm; SharesUS is the percentage of shares held 
by U.S. institutions; NumberUS is  the number of U.S. institutions invested in a firm; 
BKLMeasure is the measure of relative information revelation from Baruch, Karolyi, and 
Lemmon (2007); and  MarketVolumeIndex is the sum of total dollar trading volume on the 
domestic and cross-listing markets. The last column contains the p-value of a Chow test that 
evaluates the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for the High and Low samples are the 
same. 
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Panel A: Domestic Amihud 
  Beta Firms R-Squared Chow p-value   Coeff. t-stat 
Multimarket Trading High -0.0167 -2.09 84 5.12% 5.3% Low -0.0009 -1.38 85 2.42% 
FirmVolumeIndex High -0.0082 -1.20 91 1.73% 85.1% Low -0.0097 -2.23 91 5.9% 
Size High -0.0003 -1.66 82 4.0% 14.3% Low -0.0153 -1.53 82 3.1% 
SharesUS High -0.0040 -1.87 49 7.9% 17.5% Low -0.0210 -1.71 50 6.0% 
NumberUS High -0.0013 -2.13 54 9.0% 4.2% Low -0.0248 -2.14 60 7.8% 
BKLMeasure High -0.0132 -1.70 91 3.5% 31.1% Low -0.0047 -1.75 91 3.5% 
MarketVolumeIndex High -0.0092 -1.20 87 2.0% 96.1% Low -0.0087 -2.15 97 4.9% 
 
Panel B: Volume-Weighted Amihud 
  Beta Firms R-Squared Chow p-value   Coeff. t-stat 
Multimarket Trading High -0.0182 -2.29 84 6.1% 3.3% Low -0.0011 -1.56 85 3.1% 
FirmVolumeIndex High -0.0097 -1.44 91 2.5% 97% Low -0.0100 -2.28 91 6.2% 
Size High -0.0004 -1.80 82 4.7% 9.7% Low -0.0135 -1.71 82 4.0% 
SharesUS High -0.0043 -1.91 49 8.4% 16.2% Low -0.0221 -1.76 50 6.4% 
NumberUS High -0.0013 -2.15 54 9.3% 3.6% Low -0.0266 -2.20 60 8.5% 
BKLMeasure High -0.0138 -1.77 91 3.8% 34.1% Low -0.0062 -2.28 91 6.0% 
MarketVolumeIndex High -0.0093 -1.21 87 2.0% 91.0% Low -0.0103 -2.56 97 6.8% 
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Figure 1 Average Trading Volume Shock Correlations: Emerging Markets versus 
Developed Markets  
This figure shows equal-weighted average trading volume shock correlations (based on the 
VAR using daily trading volume changes, CorrVolChange) of firms from emerging and 
developed countries across time. The straight lines are fitted with OLS. 
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Figure 2 Price Parity vs. Volume Integration 
This figure shows a comparison of price disparity data from Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a) 
to volume shock correlations for a selection of four countries. 
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Table A1. Explanation of Variables 
Variable Rationale Definition 
Market-level 
Trading hours overlap (Overlap) More overlap means more time for investors to split trades 
and arbitrageurs to exploit mispricings.  
Percentage of domestic trading hours that overlap with 
cross-listing trading hours. Source: exchange websites. 
Trading cost difference 
(TCostDiff) 
Higher trading cost difference reduces attractiveness of 
splitting trades across markets.  
Indicator variable taking the value of one if the absolute 
difference between total trading costs on the domestic and 
cross-listing markets is above the median value of market 
pairs, else zero. Source: Chiyachantana et al. (2004).  
Trading cost sum (TCostComb) Higher total trading cost reduces profitability of arbitrage 
opportunities. 
Sum of the total trading costs for domestic and cross-listing 
markets. Source: Chiyachantana et al. (2004). 
Dollar trading volume on cross-
listing/domestic market, measured 
as absolute deviation from one 
(MarketVolumeIndex) 
Larger differences in trading volume (as a proxy for market 
liquidity) makes trade-splitting less likely. 
Log of the absolute difference between one and the ratio of 
total dollar trading volume (for all stocks) on the domestic 
and cross-listing markets. Source: Datastream. 
Total dollar trading volume on 
cross-listing and domestic market 
(MarketVolumeComb) 
Larger total trading volume (as a proxy for market liquidity) 
makes arbitrage more likely. 
Sum of total dollar trading volume on the domestic and 
cross-listing markets. Source: Datastream.  
Protection against insider trading 
in the domestic market  
(ITProtect) 
Multimarket trading is more likely once anti-insider trading 
laws (as a proxy for investor protections more generally) 
have been enforced on both markets. 
Indicator variable that equals one in year t if insider trading 
laws have been enforced in the home market during or 
before year t, else zero. Source: Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002). 
Short sales permitted (ShortSale) Short-sale constraints render arbitrage difficult or impossible, 
which can allow prices in the cross-listing and domestic 
markets to diverge. Thus trade-splitting may also be more 
attractive when there are no short-sale constraints. 
Indicator variable equal to one in year t if short sales are 
permitted in the domestic market that year, else zero. 
(During our sample period short sales were permitted in the 
U.S.) Source: Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007). 
Market design different 
(MktDesignDiff) 
When one market has a traditional floor structure while the 
other is electronic, trade-splitters and arbitrageurs may find it 
more difficult to execute trades in both markets. Difference 
in market structure may also serve as a proxy for differential 
trading costs (Jain (2005)).  
Indicator variable that equals one in year t if electronic 
trading has been introduced in either the domestic market 
or the cross-listing market, but not both, before year t, else 
zero.  Source: Jain (2005). 
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Firm-level 
Domestic and US Amihud 
illiquidity measures 
(DomesticAmihud, USAmihud) 
When a stock is more liquid, as arbitrage is easier and 
investors can split their trades with relatively less price 
impact. As a measure of illiquidity, the Amihud measure is 
higher for less liquid stocks, so we expect negative 
coefficients on both Amihud measures, although we 
recognize that they are highly correlated and thus may not 
both appear significant. 
Absolute value of the daily return on the US (domestic) 
market divided by the daily volume on the US (domestic) 
market, then averaged per firm/year. Source: Datastream.  
Firm’s dollar trading volume on 
cross-listing/domestic market, 
measured as absolute deviation 
from one (FirmVolumeIndex) 
If a stock is generally not actively traded in one market, it 
should be relatively costly for investors to split their trades. 
A stock’s average trading volume can also be interpreted as a 
rough proxy for the number of non-discretionary liquidity 
traders in each market (e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)). If 
there are more liquidity traders in each market, discretionary 
traders will derive more price-impact benefit from splitting 
their trades across markets. 
Log of the absolute difference between one and the ratio of 
the firm’s dollar trading volume on the cross-listing market 
to the domestic market. Source: Datastream. 
Stock return correlation to cross-
listing market’s return (CLCorr) 
If more of a stock's price-relevant public information is 
revealed when the cross-listing market is open, both trade-
splitters and arbitrageurs should trade more actively in both 
markets. (Ellul, Shin, and Tonks (2005) discuss the 
importance of the opening of markets, arguing that the 
market open performs an important information aggregation 
and price discovery function.) This public information 
includes firm-specific information such as earnings 
announcements and industry information such as the 
performance of major competitors. In general, such 
information is revealed before or at the time that the domestic 
market opens, which is before the cross-listing markets in our 
sample open. These information location factors should 
affect trading volume shock correlations mainly through 
price-impact minimization, although if information revelation 
causes temporary price dislocations it could also boost 
arbitrage activity. 
Stock return correlation to the cross-listing market’s return. 
Measure in year t is calculated using weekly stock returns 
and cross-listing market index returns from year t-2 to year 
t. Source: Datastream. 
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Baruch-Karolyi-Lemmon relative 
information measure 
(BKLMeasure) 
Higher BKL measure signals more firm-specific public 
information being revealed in the cross-listing market, which 
should lead to more trade-splitting and arbitrage. 
Difference in R-squared between regressions of cross-
listed stock returns on domestic and cross-listing market 
index returns and regressions of cross-listed stock returns 
on only domestic market index returns. Measure in year t is 
calculated using weekly stock returns and market index 
returns from year t-2 to year t. Source: Datastream and 
Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007) 
Percentage of shares held by U.S. 
institutions (SharesUS) 
Domestic and cross-listing market volume shocks should be 
more correlated for firms owned predominantly by 
institutional investors, who generally have more discretion 
over their trading location. 
Percentage of shares held by U.S. institutions. Source: 
Thompson Financial Shareworld. 
Number of U.S. institutions 
invested in the firm (NumberUS) 
Domestic and cross-listing market volume shocks should be 
more correlated for firms owned predominantly by 
institutional investors, who generally have more discretion 
over their trading location. 
Number of shares held by U.S. institutions. Source: 
Thompson Financial Shareworld. 
Fraction of firm’s sales from 
foreign markets (ForSales) 
Firms with more of their total sales coming from non-
domestic markets develop more of a global following.  
Fraction of foreign sales, measured in percentage points. 
Source: Worldscope. 
Technology sector (TechSec) Prices of technology-oriented cross-listed firms depend to a 
large extent on information revealed in the U.S. market 
(Pagano et al.(2002), Halling et al. (2008)), suggesting higher 
trading volume shock correlations for technology-oriented 
firms. 
Indicator variable that equals one for companies with 
technology-oriented SIC codes, else zero. Source: 
GlobalVantage and Worldscope. 
Control variables 
Firm size (Size)  Total assets in millions of dollars per year. Source: Global 
Vantage and Worldscope.  
Idiosyncratic volatility 
(StockVolatility) 
 Volatility of the residuals in a regression in which stock 
returns are regressed on returns of the cross-listing and the 
domestic market indices. Source: Datastream. 
Absolute yearly stock return 
(Return) 
 Stock’s home-currency log price change over the year. 
Source: Datastream. 
Years since first cross-listed 
(CLAge) 
 Number of years since the firm was first cross-listed. 
Source: exchange websites. 
 
